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DOES MOTHER STILL KNOW BEST?: INRE
MARRIAGE OF HARRIS AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE RIGHTS OF CUSTODIAL PARENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2004, the California Supreme Court handed
down In re Marriage of Harris,' in which it held that California's
grandparent visitation statute, section 3104 of the California Family
Code, did not violate a parent's fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of her child. Section 3104 allows courts to grant
visitation rights to the grandparent of a minor child, even over the
objection of the child's custodial parent, if: (1) the grandparent and
child share a preexisting relationship "that has engendered a bond
such that visitation is in the best interest of the child,"3 and (2) the
court balances the child's interest in visitation against the parent's
right to exercise his or her parental authority. 4 The statute further
requires the court to apply a rebuttable presumption that grandparent
visitation is not in a child's best interest if the parent with sole legal
custody opposes it.
5
The court analyzed the facial and as-applied constitutionality of
1. 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004).
2. Id. at 154.
3. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(a)(1) (West 2004).
4. Id. § 3104(a)(2).
5. Id. § 3104 (e)-(f). Section 3104(e)-(f) provides in pertinent part:
(e) There is a rebuttable presumption that the visitation of a
grandparent is not in the best interest of a minor child if the natural or
adoptive parents agree that the grandparent should not be granted
visitation rights.
(f) There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that
the visitation of a grandparent is not in the best interest of a minor
child if the parent who has been awarded sole legal and physical
custody of the child in another proceeding or with whom the child
resides if there is currently no operative custody order objects to
visitation by the grandparent.
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section 31046 and arrived at three conclusions. First, the court held
that because the child's noncustodial father supported visitation, the
custodial mother's constitutional rights had not been infringed by the
visitation order.7 Based largely on this finding, the court arrived at
its second and third conclusions: that section 3104 had been
constitutionally applied under the U.S. Constitution,8 and that the
statute was facially valid under the California Constitution.
9
This Comment evaluates the soundness of the California
Supreme Court's ruling, and addresses its possible impact on the
fundamental rights of parents to raise their children free from
unwarranted state interference. Part II presents the facts of Harris
and summarizes the procedural background preceding the court's
decision. Part III describes the state of parents' rights prior to the
court's decision, with particular emphasis on the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Troxel v. Granvillel0 and select California cases.
Part IV provides a synopsis of the issues addressed by the Harris
court and the reasoning it employed to resolve those issues. Part V
argues both that the Harris court unconstitutionally applied section
3104 under the Federal Constitution and that the statute is facially
invalid under the California Constitution. Part VI discusses the
potential ramifications of the court's holding. Finally, Part VII
proposes two amendments to section 3104. First, the California
legislature should insert a provision granting fit parents with sole
legal custody the exclusive right to make visitation decisions.
Second, the California legislature should modify section 3104(f) to
explicitly require proof of harm or potential harm by clear and
convincing evidence before allowing grandparent visitation over a fit
custodial parent's objection.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Karen Butler married Charles Harris on January 12, 1994. l1 The
marriage was stormy from the outset and racked by constant turmoil
6. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 153-54.
7. Id. at 152.
8. Id. at 154.
9. Id.
10. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
11. Harris, 96 P.3d at 143.
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and violence.' 2 According to Karen, Charles physically abused her
on numerous occasions; several of the violent incidents allegedly
occurred while she was pregnant with their daughter, Emily.13 The
couple separated on October 16, 1994, ten days before Emily was
born, and filed for divorce three months later, on January 18, 1995.14
On July 21, 1995, the trial court dissolved the marriage and granted
the mother "sole legal and physical custody" of Emily. 15 The sole
legal custody award granted the mother "the exclusive 'right and...
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education,
and welfare of' Emily,"'16 whereas the award of sole physical custody
"placed Emily 'under' [her mother's] exclusive 'supervision."
'"17
In the years following the divorce, several proceedings and court
orders addressed the visitation rights of Emily's paternal
grandparents, Charles and Leanne Harris. 18 In August of 1995, the
grandparents filed a motion for visitation with Emily.'9 The trial
court granted the motion, 2 0 but imposed two conditions: (1) that the
grandparents undergo counseling sessions to address the issue of
abuse,2' and (2) that the grandparents not allow Emily's father to be
present during the visits.
22
12. See In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 130 n.2 (Ct. App.
2001), opinion superseded by 37 P.3d 379 (Cal. 2002), affd in part, 96 P.3d
141 (Cal. 2004).
13. During Karen's pregnancy, Charles allegedly kicked Karen in the
stomach, pushed her out of a boat into the San Diego Bay, and attempted to
strangle her after she told him of her plans to leave him. Id. Charles denied
these allegations, but admitted that he used and sold drugs, and that he on
numerous occasions struck and bit Karen during incidents he described as
"mutually combative." See Harris, 96 P.3d at 144.
14. Harris, 96 P.3d at 143.
15. Id. at 144.
16. Id. at 157 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3006 (West 2004)) (omission in original) (emphasis omitted).
17. Id. at 157-58 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3007 (West 2004)) (emphasis omitted).
18. See id. at 144-46.
19. Id. at 144.
20. Id. The court granted visitation as follows: "four visits per year for up
to seven days each in 1996, six visits per year for up to seven days each in
1997, and six visits per year for up to 10 days each in 1998." Id.
21. Id. The mother requested these sessions because she believed that
Emily's paternal grandfather had abused his son Charles. Id.
22. Id.
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In April of 1996, Karen filed a motion to terminate the
grandparents' visitation rights, alleging that their visits earlier in the
year "were extremely hostile and filled with conflict," and thus
harmful to Emily.23 She further asserted that "Emily had nightmares
after the paternal grandparents' last visit, cried during her nap times,
and clung to the mother 'for days after the visits,' all of which
behavior was unusual for her." 24 The court again denied Karen's
motion, but modified the previous visitation order to permit fewer
visits per year.
25
In February of 2000, Charles notified Karen that he had moved
into his parents' home.26 Nevertheless, Charles' parents, Emily's
grandparents, indicated that Charles would have no contact with
Emily during her visits to the house.27  Three months later, the
grandparents sought a visitation order that would allow them two
weeks with Emily during August, one week during the Christmas
and New Year holidays, one week during Easter, and one week in
June.2 8  Moreover, in association with these proposed visits the
grandparents asked the court to order the mother to place six-year-
old Emily alone on a plane and to send her from her new home in
Utah to the grandparents' home in San Diego.2 9  Finally, the
grandparents requested that the court allow Charles to have
supervised visits with Emily during her trips to California.
30
Karen objected to the grandparents' requests. 3 1  In her
responsive motion, she asked the court to end court-ordered
visitation.32  Karen claimed the visitation was "disruptive and




26. Id. at 145.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 158 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). By this time, Karen and
Emily were living in Utah with Karen's new husband, Mark Butler, and his six
children. See id. at 144.
30. Id. at 158.
31. See id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
32. Id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
33. In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 132 (Ct. App. 2001).
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for Emily's time risked destroying "the feeling of belonging that
every child needs in order to feel safe and secure with her family in
her home."
34
The trial court once again granted the grandparents' visitation
request despite the mother's objection.35 In doing so, the court noted
that it did not question the mother's motivation in seeking to end
court-ordered visitation,36 acknowledging that the mother "believes
that it is best for this child if she provides the family unit and she
makes the decisions as to what contact, if any, would exist between
other people and this child.' 37 The court, however, was of the "firm
belief' that Emily could benefit from having a relationship with the
grandparents, 38 and did not believe that the mother would encourage
this relationship "in spite of what she [said] .,39  Though it
acknowledged that its decision interfered with the mother's right to
raise her children as she saw fit, 40 the trial court nevertheless
concluded that visitation was in Emily's best interests, and ordered it
to continue.4 1
The court of appeal reversed, finding that the visitation order
violated Karen's due process rights under both the federal and
California constitutions.42 The court unanimously held that the
visitation statute was facially unconstitutional under the state
constitution unless the presumption mandated by section 3104(f) was
construed to require "clear and convincing evidence that the child
34. Id. at 132 n.4. The mother's declaration stated in part:
[The grandparents] complain if [Emily] shares her gifts with her
siblings. We have every right to teach Emily our values and if sharing
is one of our values, then so be it .... The Harrises constantly remind
Emily she is a Harris, not a Butler .... It concerns me that my child
feels that I have no control over what happens to her.
Id.
35. Harris, 96 P.3d at 146.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 158 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. Id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) (alteration in original).
40. Id. at 146 ("I do have to acknowledge that the grandparents are
interfering to some degree with the mother's rights as a parent to the extent
they exist to raise children .....
41. Id.
42. See In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 142-43 (Ct. App.
2001).
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will suffer harm or potential harm if visitation is not ordered. ' 4 3 The
court construed section 3104(f) in this manner to preserve its
constitutionality. 44 The court also found, however, that the lower
court applied "nothing more than... a bare-bones best interest
test.' '45 Because it did not require the grandparents to prove harm or
potential harm by clear and convincing evidence, the court held that
section 3104 had been unconstitutionally applied to Karen.46 The
grandparents appealed, and the California Supreme Court granted
review.
47
III. BACKGROUND ON PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Parental Rights Under the United States Constitution
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." '48 The U.S. Supreme Court has long
recognized that in addition to guaranteeing fair procedure the Clause
includes "a substantive component" that provides heightened
protection to those liberty interests deemed "fundamental."4 9 The
High Court has regarded parents' interest in "the care, custody, and
control of their children [as] perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court."
50
43. Id. at 141.
44. See id. at 140.
45. Id. at 142-43.
46. Id. at 144.
47. See In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 143 (Cal. 2004).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
50. Id; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 ("In a long line of cases, we
have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right[] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one's children.. .. ");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (explaining
that "the fundamental theory of liberty" protects the "liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control," free from unreasonable state interference).
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed the fundamental nature of
parents' rights to raise their children in the recent case of Troxel v.
Granville.?1 The controversy in Troxel developed when the parents
of a deceased father of two children petitioned for visitation under
Washington's visitation rights statute.52 The statute permitted any
person to petition for visitation at any time, and allowed a court to
grant visitation whenever it found that such visitation would serve
the child's best interest.53 The children's mother did not oppose all
visitation, but wanted to limit visitation to once per month.54 The
trial court found that more extensive visitation would be in the
children's best interest and therefore granted the grandparents'
request despite the mother's objection.55
Although it declined to declare the Washington statute facially
unconstitutional, 56 a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court found that
the trial court unconstitutionally applied the statute to the mother.
57
Three factors were critical to the verdict.58 First, the Court noted that
no one had proven, or even alleged, that the mother was an unfit
parent. 59 This aspect of the case was crucial, the Court held, because
"there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of
their children., 60 Second, the plurality noted that the trial court gave
no "special weight" to the fit parent's determination of what was best
for her children, but rather placed the burden on the mother to prove
that visitation was not in her children's interests.61 Finally, the Court
observed that there had been "no allegation that Granville ever
51. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 ("[It cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause ... protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.").
52. See id. at 60-61.
53. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West Supp. 2005) ("Any
person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time... The court
may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best
interest of the child .... ).
54. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
55. Id. at 61-62.
56. See id. at 73.
57. Id. at 67.
58. See id. at 68-73.
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sought to cut off visitation entirely," 62 and that the case thus involved
a simple disagreement between a judge and a mother as to how much
visitation would be best for the children. 63 The Court rejected the
legitimacy of such a scenario, declaring that "the Due Process Clause
does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make child-rearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a 'better' decision could be made."
4
Thus, a distillation of the Troxel decision yields three factors
crucial to the evaluation of whether a visitation statute has been
constitutionally applied. The first factor is whether the court
reviewing the visitation order assessed the fitness of the parent
opposing visitation.65  This finding is necessary because Troxel
mandates the presumption in favor of a parent's child-rearing
decision only if that parent is found fit.66 Second, if the court finds
that the parent is fit, then the court reviewing the visitation request
must give "special weight" to the parent's determination of what is
best for his or her child.67 Finally, the Troxel plurality suggested that
a court must give the parent opposing court-ordered visitation a
chance to voluntarily negotiate a visitation plan.68 Under Troxel, any
court ruling on a visitation request without considering these factors
risks having its decision reversed.
Although Troxel offered some guidance, the Court's deliberately
narrow opinion also left important issues unresolved. 69  First,
although the plurality held that deference to the fit parents' decisions
62. Id. at71.
63. Id. at 72.
64. Id. at 72-73.
65. See id. at 68.
66. See id. The Court stated:
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent's children.
Id. at 68-69.
67. See id. at 69.
68. See id. at 71; see also Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 145 (Ct.
App. 2001) (relying on Troxel for the proposition that judges cannot ignore a
competent custodial parent's "voluntary efforts for visitation").




was required, it did not specify the standard of review that courts
should apply in protecting those parents' rights.70 While it reiterated
that a parent's liberty interest in raising her children was
fundamental, the plurality nevertheless abstained from applying strict
scrutiny, the standard usually used to review laws that interfere with
such rights. 7 1  Second, the Court expressly declined to consider
whether due process requires a showing of harm or potential harm to
the child before visitation is granted over a fit parent's objection.72
Thus, in the wake of the plurality's narrow holding, "[s]tate courts
have been left with the laborious task of filling in the gaps left open
by the Troxel decision.
73
B. Parental Rights Under the California Constitution
Before Harris
Parents' child-rearing rights are also protected by Article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution.74  A custodial parent's
fundamental right to raise her children resides within this
constitution's privacy guarantee. 75 Recognizing the protected status
of parental rights under both the federal and state charters, the
California courts have rigorously scrutinized all statutes that
significantly interfere with this fundamental liberty interest.
76
70. See id.
71. See id. Justice Thomas noted that "curiously," none of the plurality
opinions articulated the "appropriate standard of review." Troxel, 530 U.S. at
80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated that the Court should
adhere to its precedents and apply strict scrutiny to any law interfering with
fundamental rights. 1d. (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
73. Michael Varela, All for the Love of a Child: The Current State of
California 's Grandparent Visitation Statute in Light of Troxel v. Granville, 44
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 595, 605 (2004).
74. See Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. Article 1, section 1 of the
California Constitution provides that "[a]ll people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1, §
1.
75. See In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 159 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Cal.
1977)).
76. See, e.g., People v. Silva, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 185 (Ct. App. 1994)
("Legislation which.., impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right is
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Each state, however, reserves the right to provide greater
protection to its citizens than the Federal Constitution mandates.77
The California courts have apparently seized this opportunity,
safeguarding parents' child-rearing interests perhaps even more
aggressively than their federal counterparts. While the federal courts
have recently departed from their tradition of applying strict scrutiny
to laws that significantly infringe on parental rights,78 the California
courts have declined to make a similar break from tradition.
Accordingly, under the California Constitution, any legislation that
significantly interferes with the fundamental right to parent will be
struck down if it fails to meet strict scrutiny.
79
Further, in a long line of decisions, the California courts have
voiced a strong reluctance to meddle with family affairs absent
compelling circumstances,8 0 and have declared that parents' rights
shall "only give[] way upon a showing of parental unfitness,
detrimental to the child's welfare."'', Recognizing the primacy of
parental autonomy, the California Court of Appeal has declared that
"[a] showing of harm or potential harm is constitutionally required to
justify governmental interference with child rearing," 82 and the
California Supreme Court has provided that "[p]arenting is a
fundamental right.., disturbed only in extreme cases of persons
acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood. 83  In sum, the
California courts' rulings evince a state policy of interfering with
fundamental parenting rights only when state intervention is
necessary to protect a child from potential harm.
subject to strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if it is necessary to further a
compelling state interest."); accord Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 145
(Ct. App. 2001).
77. See Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139 ("The state's right to impose higher
constitutional standards than those required under the United States
Constitution cannot be seriously questioned.").
78. See id. at 135 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000)).
79. See Silva, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185.
80. See In re Marriage of Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (Ct. App. 1983)
("The concept of family privacy embodies not simply a policy of minimum
state intervention but also a presumption of parental autonomy.").
81. In re Marriage of Jenkins, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334-35 (Ct. App. 1981).
82. Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
83. In re Carnaleta B., 579 P.2d 514, 518 (Cal. 1978).
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C. Grandparents'Rights to Court-Ordered Visitation
with Their Grandchildren
Grandparents, by contrast, enjoy no constitutionally-based right
to court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren. 84 Rather, any
such rights emanate solely from state statutes. 85 Perhaps recognizing
that close relationships with grandparents can benefit children, all
fifty states have enacted laws providing for some form of
grandparent visitation. 86  Nevertheless, it remains a fundamental
precept of American jurisprudence that any statutory right must yield
to those rights guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
87
IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S
ANALYSIS IN HARRIS
A. The Mother's Claims Under the United States Constitution
1. Section 3104 is not Facially Unconstitutional Under the
United States Constitution
The Harris court first addressed the mother's claim that the
statute was per se invalid under the Federal Constitution.8 8  in
addressing this issue, the court was mindful of the Troxel plurality's
reluctance to declare visitation statutes facially unconstitutional.89
The court also noted Troxel's emphasis on the excessive breadth of
the Washington statute and its failure to afford "special weight" to
parents' child-rearing decisions as primary reasons for the statute's
84. Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136.
85. See In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 146 (Cal. 2004)
("Grandparents' rights to court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren are
purely statutory.").
86. Varela, supra note 73, at 596 n.3 (listing each of the fifty states'
grandparent visitation statutes).
87. See Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 359 (Cal. 2002)
(Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the California Constitution
is the "supreme law of [the] state"); see Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142
(stating that parents' constitutional rights are given more protection than
grandparents' statutory rights).
88. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 149.
89. See id. at 150 ("[T]he constitutional protections in this area are best
'elaborated with care."' (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000))).
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constitutional infirmity.
90
With Troxel's guidelines in mind, the court upheld the facial
validity of section 3104.91 In doing so, it observed that the statute is,
in several respects, narrower than the Washington statute.92 First,
unlike the statute in Troxel, section 3104 does not grant all persons
the right to petition for visitation; rather, it limits that right to the
child's grandparents. 93 Second, section 3104 requires a "preexisting
relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild that has
engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the
child" before visitation may be ordered. 94 Finally, section 3104(a)(2)
requires the court to balance the child's interest in visitation against
the parent's right to exercise his or her parental authority before
ordering visitation.
95
The court further found that, unlike the statute at issue in Troxel,
section 3104 gave "special weight" to fit parents' child-rearing
decisions.96  The court noted that section 3104 protects parents'
rights by mandating a rebuttable presumption against visitation if the
parents agree that such visitation is not in their child's best interest
97
or if the parent with sole custody objects to it.98 The court buttressed
its conclusion by stating that section 3104(e) was "cit[ed] with
approval" by the Troxel plurality.99 Based on these findings, the
court held that "section 3104 does not suffer from the constitutional
infirmities that plagued the Washington statute considered in
Troxel," and rejected the mother's argument that the statute was
facially invalid.100
2. Section 3104 was not Unconstitutionally Applied to the Mother
Under the United States Constitution
The court next considered the mother's complaint that section
90. Id. at 150-51.
91. Id. at 151.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(a)(1) (West 2004)).
95. Id. (citing § 3104(a)(2)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 151-52 (citing § 3104); see supra note 5.
98. Id. at 152 (citing § 3104); see supra note 5.
99. Id. at 151.
100. Id.
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3104, as applied to her, violated the Federal Constitution.' 0 ' First,
the court distinguished the case at bar from Troxel, observing that the
latter involved a visitation order being opposed by a sole surviving
fit parent.'0 2 The present case, in contrast, involved two fit parents
who disagreed over grandparent visitation.10 3  In drawing this
distinction, the court stressed that in the present case, at the time the
visitation order was issued, the father's parental rights were not yet
terminated. 
0 4
The court conceded that, under Troxel, "[c]ourt-ordered
grandparent visitation over the objection of a sole surviving parent
implicates that parent's right to the custody and control of his or her
child."'1 5 Nonetheless, it rejected the mother's argument that her
parenting rights were similarly infringed by the visitation order in the
present case. 106 The court reasoned that "[n]othing in the decision in
Troxel suggests that an order for grandparent visitation that is
supported by one parent infringes upon the parental rights of the
other parent."' 0'1 7 Finding that the mother had not cited any authority
to suggest that her parental rights were implicated by a visitation
order the father supported, the court held that section 3104 had been
constitutionally applied under the facts.1
0 8
C. The Mother's Claims Under the California Constitution
Lastly, the court turned to the mother's assertion that section
3104 was unconstitutional-both facially and as-applied-under the
state charter.' 0 9  The mother claimed that the visitation statute
impermissibly infringed upon her privacy right guaranteed by the
California Constitution.' '
0
The court disposed of the mother's state claims in the same
101. See id. at 152.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See id. ("The mother had been awarded sole legal and physical custody
of Emily, but this did not terminate the father's parental rights, nor did it




108. Id. at 152-54.
109. See id. at 153-54.
110. See id. at 153.
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manner that it dismissed her federal challenges."'I It first
distinguished the cases the mother cited, reasoning that none of the
cases addressed the privacy guarantee in a context similar to the
present case.'12 Again finding that "[n]one of these cases support the
mother's argument that an order for grandparent visitation that is
supported by one parent infringes upon the parental rights of the
other parent," the court held that section 3104 was valid both facially
and in its application.
113
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
As the following analysis will demonstrate, the Harris court
erred in concluding that the mother's constitutional parenting rights
were not infringed by the trial court's visitation order. This
erroneous holding led directly to the court's subsequent failure to
find that the application of section 3104 violated the mother's
fundamental parenting rights under Troxel. Finally, the court's
interpretation of section 3104(f), which does not require
grandparents to prove by clear and convincing evidence that denying
visitation may harm the child, renders the statute facially invalid
under the California Constitution."l
4
A. The Father's Support for Visitation was Without Legal Effect,
and Therefore did not Affect the Mother's Constitutional Rights
The primary basis upon which the court rejected the mother's
as-applied federal claim and the entirety of her state claim was that
the father supported the visitation order. 115 The father's support was
crucial, the court reasoned, because nothing in Troxel or in the cases
cited by the mother indicated "that an order for grandparent visitation
that is supported by one parent infringes upon the parental rights of
11. See id. at 153-54.
112. See id. (reasoning that the three cited cases dealt respectively with the
privacy guarantee in the contexts of the right to refuse medical treatment, the
right to obtain an abortion without parental consent, and the right to be free of
compulsory drug testing).
113. Id. at 154.
114. This was the conclusion reached by a unanimous Court of Appeal. See
In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 140 (Ct. App. 2001).
115. See Harris, 96 P.3d at, 152.
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the other."' 1 6  The rule that the court has implicitly adopted,
therefore, is that a sole custodial parent's fundamental right to raise
her child is never implicated by court-ordered grandparent visitation,
even if he or she objects to it, as long as the noncustodial parent with
parental rights assents to such visitation.11 7 This holding has the
problematic effect of allowing a noncustodial parent to nullify a
custodial parent's constitutional right to make child-rearing
decisions, even though a noncustodial parent, by definition, has no
legal authority to make such decisions in the first instance. 
118
Although the rule it adopted was unprecedented, the court
provided little explanation for its holding, and it failed to cite any
legal authority to support the new rule."l9 It made no attempt to
articulate why a noncustodial father's support for visitation should be
permitted to affect, much less negate, a sole custodial parent's
statutory and constitutional right to raise her children.'
20
The court should not have relied upon the father's support for
the grandparents' visitation request, because such support was
without legal consequence. 121 As previously noted, the trial court's
award of sole legal custody gave Karen the exclusive right and
responsibility to make all decisions relating to Emily's upbringing,1
22
which included the right to decide with whom Emily should
associate. 123  It follows that Charles had no legal right to make
116. Id.
117. See id. at 161 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
118. See id. at 161 n.2 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Ironically...
although Charles himself has no right to visit Emily, his support for
Grandparents' visitation request completely negates Karen's constitutional...
protection against state interference with her parenting decisions as Emily's
sole custodian.").
119. Id. at 156 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The majority's
categorical declaration that the mother has no federal or state constitutional
interest at stake in this proceeding is bereft of legal authority .....
120. See id. (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. See id. at 161 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Charles's support
for Grandparents' visitation request is legally irrelevant .... ."); id. at 170
(Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[A]t this point the father's parental
rights have been terminated, and hence his views regarding grandparent
visitation are not relevant.").
122. See id. at 157 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3006 (West 2004)) (defining sole legal custody).
123. See id. at 159 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Punsly v. Ho,
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similar decisions on Emily's behalf.124 Thus, given the effect of the
custody award, the court erred in allowing the father's legally
inconsequential endorsement of the visitation request to abrogate the
mother's fundamental right to parent. The court's only justification
for the rule was that the cases cited by the mother did not support her
position. 2 5  As Justice Chin observed in his concurring and
dissenting opinion, however, "nothing in any of those decisions
supports the majority's view, and the majority does not contend
otherwise."'
126
Thus, because the noncustodial father's endorsement of the
visitation order was legally immaterial, the court erred in holding
that the mother's fundamental right to raise her child was nullified by
such an endorsement. As a result, Karen Butler's parenting rights
remained protected under the California and federal constitutions,
and were infringed by the trial court's visitation order.
B. The Application of Section 3104 to the Mother was
Unconstitutional Under Troxel
Because the mother's child-rearing rights remained protected by
the Due Process Clause, the application of section 3104 in this case
had to satisfy the three factors emphasized by the Troxel plurality in
105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 145 (2001)).
124. As the majority observed, noncustodial parents retain certain parental
rights following an award of sole custody to the other parent. See id. at 152.
For example, a noncustodial parent has the right to reasonable visitation with
the child, CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100(a) (West 2004), and the right to access the
child's medical and school records, CAL. FAM. CODE § 3025 (West 2004).
However, the majority failed to cite any authority to suggest that the right to
direct the child's upbringing (and the related right to make decisions regarding
third-party visitation) is included among the rights retained by noncustodial
parents. There is, however, authority to the contrary. See, e.g., Burge v. City
of San Francisco, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1953) (opinion by Justice Traynor),
(explaining that "[c]ustody embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to
the rearing of a child, including its care. It includes the right ... to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health,
and religion." (citation omitted)); see also Lerner v. Superior Court, 242 P.2d
321, 323 (Cal. 1952) (Justice Traynor arguing that "[t]he essence of custody
is... the right to make decisions regarding [a child's] care and control,
education, health, and religion").
125. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 153-54.
126. Id. at 163 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
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order to be valid.
127
Troxel first requires the court reviewing a visitation request to
determine whether the parent opposing visitation is unfit; that is,
whether that parent provides less than adequate care for her child.
128
In the present case, just as in Troxel, no party to the proceeding ever
questioned the mother's fitness. 129 Thus, because there was no
finding of parental unfitness, Karen was entitled to the presumption
that she was acting in Emily's best interest when she opposed
grandparent visitation.130
Because the court deemed Karen fit, Troxel next required the
court to grant special weight to her determination of Emily's best
interests.13 ' The trial court's decision clearly failed to meet this
requirement. Both Troxel and section 3104(f)132 directed the court to
presume that visitation was not in Emily's best interests; however,
the court did not defer in any way to her mother's child-rearing
decision.' 33 Instead, it applied a simple best interest test, without
applying any presumption in favor of Karen's assessment of what
was best for her daughter.' 34  The trial court's failure to afford
special weight to the mother's child-rearing choices directly
contravened Troxel's requirements.
Finally, Troxel suggested that a trial court must consider
whether the parent is willing to allow any visitation, absent a court-
order. 135 This consideration reflects the apparent rationale that courts
should not intrude upon family affairs unless other options have been
exhausted. 136  In the present case, just as in Troxel, the child's
mother did not seek to terminate all grandparent visitation. 137 To the
127. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-72 (2000).
128. See id. at 68-69 (defining "fitness").
129. See id. at 68.
130. See id. at 68-69.
131. See id. at 70.
132. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(0 (West 2004).
133. See In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 146 (Cal. 2004). For an
overview of the trial court's decision, see supra Part II.
134. See supra Part II.
135. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
136. See id. at 72-73.
137. See id. at 71; see also Harris, 96 P.3d at 170 (Brown, J., concurring and
dissenting) (observing that Karen did not oppose all visitation, but merely
"objected to the expansive order regarding her then five-year-old daughter").
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contrary, the mother stated in her responsive declaration to the
grandparents' petition that "she never would prevent Emily from
being with her paternal grandparents," but that she simply objected
to having a court force Emily to leave her family to accomplish these
visits. 13  Karen's amenability to voluntary visitation should have
prevented the trial court from issuing its visitation order and
interfering with her constitutional right to raise Emily as she saw fit.
In violation of Troxel's guidelines, however, the trial court did not
give due consideration to the mother's willingness to allow
visitation, and in fact expressly disregarded it.' 
39
Because it did not give special weight to the fit mother's
parenting decision, and because it failed to give appropriate
consideration to the mother's willingness to negotiate voluntary
visitation, the trial court's application of section 3104 ran afoul of
Troxel's mandates. Thus, the application of that statute denied Karen
Butler due process under the Federal Constitution. Unfortunately,
the California Supreme Court's conclusion that Karen's fundamental
parenting rights were never implicated prevented the court from
properly analyzing this issue.
C. Section 3104 Fails Strict Scrutiny, and is Therefore Facially
Invalid Under the California Constitution
As the Harris court correctly observed, section 3104 is far
narrower than the visitation statute at issue in Troxel.140  Section
3104 allows only grandparents to petition for visitation, requires a
preexisting bond between grandparent and child, and directs the
court to balance the interests of the parent and child before a
visitation order may be issued. 14 1 In contrast, the "breathtakingly
broad" Washington statute lacked all of these limitations.
142
Nevertheless, the Troxel plurality upheld its facial validity under the
138. Harris, 96 P.3d at 145.
139. See id. at 146 (quoting the trial judge's remark that "'[I do not believe]
there is any realistic possibility that if I leave this to the mother's good
graces ... that she would do anything to encourage the relationship in spite of
what she says').
140. See id. at 151.
141. See id. at 151-52.
142. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
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Federal Constitution. 14 3  It necessarily follows that the narrower
California statute is also valid on its face. 144 Thus, the court properly
rejected Karen's argument that section 3104 is invalid per se under
the Federal Constitution.1
45
Still, the validity of section 3104 under the minimum mandates
of the federal charter does not automatically constitute legitimacy
under the California Constitution. In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court
departed from its tradition of applying strict scrutiny to all laws that
interfere with fundamental rights. 14 6 California has yet to make a
similar break with precedent, however, and has consistently applied
strict scrutiny to laws that severely infringe on fundamental
liberties. 147 Therefore, any law that infringes the legally recognized
fundamental right to raise one's children must, under California
precedent, be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest.1
48
Accordingly, the first step in assessing the validity of section
3104 is to determine whether the statute serves a compelling
government interest. 49  There is no doubt that the state has a
compelling interest in preserving children's health and welfare.
150
California's precedents demonstrate that the state's need to interfere
with parental autonomy only becomes compelling, however, when a
child is threatened with harm.' 5 1  It follows that the state may
constitutionally intrude upon a fit parent's visitation preference only
if depriving such visitation will potentially injure the child. 152 A
143. See id. at 73.
144. See In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 138 (Ct. App.
2001).
145. SeeHarris, 96 P.3d at 151.
146. See discussion supra Part III.A.
147. See discussion supra Part III.B.
148. See, e.g., Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 145 (Ct. App. 2001);
People v. Silva, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 185 (Ct. App. 1994).
149. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 387 (1998).
150. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 819 (Cal. 1997).
151. See discussion supra Part III.B.
152. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Washington statute, which did not require a
showing of harm but merely required the petitioning party to show that
visitation was in the child's best interests, "lacks even a legitimate
governmental interest-to say nothing of a compelling one-in second-
guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties")
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court may not overrule a fit parent's child-rearing decision simply
because it believes visitation would be more beneficial to the
child. 153 The Harris court's interpretation of section 3104, which
allows judicial intervention without proof of potential harm,
impermissibly authorizes the state to invade on a fundamental right
before any compelling state interest arises.154 Thus, without a harm
requirement, the statute does not satisfy the compelling interest
standard and cannot withstand strict scrutiny.
Even assuming that section 3104 satisfies the compelling
interest requirement, it is nevertheless unconstitutional because, as
interpreted by the Harris court, it is not narrowly tailored to promote
that interest. 155  The problem lies in the court's interpretation of
section 3104(f).156 This subsection directs the court considering a
visitation petition to presume in favor of a fit parent's visitation
preference. 57  The provision is silent as to the strength of the
required presumption, however. 158 As construed by the Harris court,
section 3104(f) does not require grandparents to rebut the
presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence that the
child will be harmed if visitation is denied. 159 Instead, the court's
interpretation merely requires the grandparents to overcome a
rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that visitation
is not in the child's best interest if the custodial parent objects.16
0
(Thomas, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 72-73.
154. See In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 154 (Cal. 2004) (remanding
the case not to determine whether denying visitation would result in harm, but
rather to determine whether it would serve the child's "best interest").
155. A statute is narrowly tailored only if the state cannot achieve its goal
through any means less restrictive of the constitutional right at issue. 16A AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 387 (1998).
156. SeeHarris, 96 P.3d at 151.
157. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(f) (West 2004).
158. See id. § 3104(f). Presumptions can vary widely in effect, ranging from
conclusive presumptions to presumptions that are rebutted once any evidence
contrary to the presumption is admitted. See Stephen A. Newman, Five
Critical Issues in New York's Grandparent Visitation Law After Troxel v.
Granville, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 489, 519 (2004).
159. Harris, 96 P.3d at 151.
160. Under the California Evidence Code, a presumption affecting the
burden of proof "impose[s] upon the party against whom it operates the burden
of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact." CAL. EvID. CODE § 606
1890
PARENTAL RIGHTS
So construed, section 3104(") is not narrowly tailored because an
equally effective alternative existed that would have infringed less on
custodial parents' constitutional rights.' 6' The narrower alternative
would have been to require clear and convincing evidence that
denying visitation will injure the child before allowing a court to
override a fit parent's visitation preference. 162 This standard would
have restricted government interference with fundamental parenting
rights by limiting the circumstances under which a court may
permissibly substitute its decision for the parent's. 163  Further, the
standard would have been at least equally effective in protecting
children's well-being. 64 It recognizes that fit parents, not courts, are
usually best equipped to assess which relationships will serve a
child's best interests, and accordingly leaves children's welfare in the
hands of those who are best positioned to protect it.' 65 Therefore,
because section 3104(f) is unnecessarily broad with respect to the
grounds on which visitation may be ordered, 166 it is not narrowly
drawn and fails strict scrutiny.
167
(West 2004); see Harris, 96 P.3d at 165 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
161. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 387 (2004) ("If there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve a compelling state purpose with a lesser
burden on the constitutionally protected activity, the state may not choose the
way of greater interference; if it acts at all, it must choose the less drastic
means.").
162. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 166 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
163. See id. at 168 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
164. See id (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
165. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000).
166. As Professors Harris and Teitelbaum have explained,
Statutes allowing visitation by grandparents (and others) may be broad
or narrow in two respects. They may be broad or narrow with respect
to the nonparents who may seek visitation and they may be broad or
narrow as to the grounds on which visitation may be ordered.... [A]
narrow statute would require showing a likelihood of harm should
visitation be denied.
LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 840 (2d ed. 2000).
167. On a final note, it has yet to be conclusively established that increased
contact with grandparents is actually beneficial to children. See Elaine D.
Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87
W. VA. L. REv. 295, 299-301 (1985); see also HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra
note 165, at 834 (noting that there is "considerable evidence that grandparents
rarely are involved or deeply interested in their grandchildren's problems"). If
grandparent visitation is neither a proven nor effective means of advancing
children's health, the state is hard-pressed to assert that there is no way to
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VI. THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HARRIS
The California Supreme Court's decision in Harris could have
several far-reaching consequences for the authority of parents to
make child-rearing decisions without undue state interference.
First, and perhaps most important, the court's holding deprives
sole custodial parents of their fundamental parenting rights in
situations where the noncustodial parent endorses grandparent
visitation. The Harris outcome clearly illustrates this consequence.
When Charles voiced his support for the grandparents' visitation bid,
Karen was immediately stripped of any constitutionally-based
objections to visitation. 168 Thus, the rule adopted in Harris allows
noncustodial parents, who, by definition, have no legal rights to raise
their children, to completely negate sole custodial parents' child-
rearing rights. This illogical result unfairly denies a fit custodial
parent her fundamental right and duty to make assessments regarding
what will serve her child's best interests.
Additionally, the court's failure to protect custodial parents
leaves such parents at the mercy of state power. As noted by Justice
Chin, it is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that "due
process protections do not apply if no state action implicates or
infringes upon a constitutionally protected right or interest."' 69 Thus,
if a custodial parent's rights are never implicated by visitation orders
that are supported by the noncustodial parent, the state may override
the custodial parent's decisions without denying the parent's due
process.170 The court may, for example, issue a visitation order ex
parte, without providing the custodial parent with notice or a
hearing. 17 1 Such unchecked state power leaves custodial parents
vulnerable to arbitrary deprivation of their fundamental child-rearing
rights. 1
72
promote this interest in a manner less burdensome on parents' constitutional
rights.
168. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 152.
169. Id. at 163 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
170. See id (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
171. See id (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
172. See id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). As Justice Chin observed,
"[t]he state may also set any (or no) standard for granting such a [visitation]
request or impose the burden of proof on a custodial parent to show why it
should be denied." Id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Baxter
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Finally, the court's failure to require clear and convincing
evidence of harm or potential harm not only renders section 3104
unconstitutional, but also subjects families to excessive state
interference. Without a requirement of clear and convincing
evidence that harm or potential harm will result, a parent may be
haled into court anytime a grandparent disagrees with her decision to
deny visitation, and would be forced to bear the burden and expense
of defending her child-rearing decisions before a judge.' 73 As noted
by the Court in Troxel, the very act of having to litigate a visitation
request "can itself be 'so disruptive of the parent-child relationship
that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain
basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated."1
74
The court's decision, however, does nothing to insulate families from
this burden, and leaves custodial parents' child-rearing decisions
vulnerable to constant-and costly-second-guessing by the courts.
VII. A PROPOSED CURE FOR HARRIS'S INFIRMITIES
Harris strips a sole custodial parent of all constitutional
parenting rights in situations where the noncustodial parent supports
court-ordered grandparent visitation. 175 Left unaltered, Harris poses
voiced similar concerns, stating:
[U]nder the majority's approach, a custodial parent would have no
constitutional protection whatsoever if a state overrode that parent's
objections and forced his or her child to go on visits with any third
party-even with complete strangers, and even if such visitation was
demonstrably harmful to the child-as long as the noncustodial parent
acquiesced in the court order.
Id. at 156 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
173. See id. at 160 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brown
noted that "absent [a requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence]
parents would encounter not only unwarranted judicial intrusion into their
private lives, but would also incur significant costs in seemingly unending
litigation that would undermine their ability to care for the very children the
statute is presumably intended to protect." Id. at 169 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
174. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at
101 (Kennedy, J. dissenting)). Justice Kennedy further observed that "[i]f a
single parent who is struggling to raise a child is faced with visitation demands
from a third party, the attorney's fees alone might destroy her hopes and plans
for the child's future." Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175. See discussion supra Part VI.
Summer 2005] 1893
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1871
a grave threat to parents' rights to raise their children free from
governmental second-guessing and intrusion. Because the liberty
interest in rearing one's children is fundamental, it merits protection
commensurate with its fundamentality. It must not be nullified by
the child-rearing choices of parents who lack legal authority to make
such choices. Thus, the state should act to fill the void left by the
court's decision and restore protection for custodial parents in
situations such as that in Harris.
Therefore, this Comment posits that the California legislature
should amend section 3104 to include a provision that explicitly
grants sole custodial parents' 76 the exclusive right to determine
whether to grant or deny visitation privileges to grandparents. To
ensure that the effects of Harris do not survive this amendment, the
provision should unambiguously declare that a noncustodial parent's
preference for grandparent visitation shall have no legal effect. This
proposed provision will undo Harris's potentially calamitous
consequences and re-establish necessary safeguards for custodial
parents' rights.
In amending section 3104, however, the California legislature
should do more than merely mitigate Harris's impact on sole
custodial parents. Rather, it should do what the Harris court did not:
enhance custodial parents' rights by replacing section 3104's "best
interest" standard 17 7 with one that requires proof of harm by clear
and convincing evidence before visitation may be ordered over a fit
parent's objection. 178  Under this revised standard, judicial
contravention of a fit parent's visitation preferences will only be
permitted where the grandparent can prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that denying visitation would bring potential harm to the
176. For the purposes of this provision, a "sole custodial parent" shall be
defined as one who has been granted sole custody under section 3006 of the
California Family Code. For further discussion of section 3006, see supra text
accompanying note 16.
177. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(f) (West 2004).
178. The Court of Appeals unanimously endorsed this standard, holding that
section 3104 was facially unconstitutional without a harm requirement. See In
re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 140 (Ct. App. 2001); see also
discussion supra Part VI (discussing the potential implications of Harris).
However, this standard was dismissed without discussion in the Supreme




The proposed standard is superior to the existing one in
numerous respects. First, requiring a showing of harm is more
consistent with California's precedents than the current "best
interest" standard. The California state courts have made it clear that
interference with a fit parent's right to raise her children is justifiable
only when intervention is necessary to protect the child from harm or
potential harm.18 0 The state may not usurp the child-rearing role of a
fit parent simply because it feels that a better decision regarding the
child's best interests can be made.' 81 Requiring proof of potential
harm to the child as a condition precedent to court-ordered visitation
will limit the instances in which the state can interfere with parental
rights, and will help ensure that judicial commandeering of parental
authority does not needlessly occur.
Further, given the constitutional interests at stake in grandparent
visitation proceedings, section 3104 should require proof by clear
and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence. 182 Both the U.S. and California Supreme Courts have held
that the preponderance standard applies only in cases where society
has little interest in the outcome; civil suits for monetary damages
are one example. 183 In cases where the "interests at stake ... are...
179. The "harm" standard has been endorsed by legal scholars and
commentators. See, e.g., Michael Goldberg, Survey of Illinois Law: Family
Law - Grandparent Visitation, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 785, 816 (2003). It has also
been adopted by an increasing number of state courts. See, e.g., Joan
Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward
Awarding Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48
DRAKE L. REv. 279, 331 (2000); see also Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271,
1277 (Fla. 1996) (holding that there is no compelling state interest absent a
showing of potential harm to the child). The clear and convincing evidence
standard has found similar support among legal commentators. See, e.g.,
Newman, supra note 157, at 527-28; Varela, supra note 73, at 616.
180. For an overview of California precedent regarding the state's authority
to intervene in family affairs, see discussion supra Part III.B.
181. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000).
182. Under the Harris court's interpretation of the presumption mandated by
section 3104(f), grandparents need only prove that visitation would "more
likely than not" serve the child's best interests. In re Marriage of Harris, 96
P.3d 141, 165 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
183. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Weiner v.
Fleischman, 816 P.2d 892, 898 (Cal. 1991).
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more substantial than mere loss of money," 14 however, the clear and
convincing evidence standard governs. In section 3104 proceedings,
parents' constitutional child-rearing rights are implicated. The low
burden of proof imposed on grandparents by the preponderance
standard creates too great a risk that a fit parent's constitutional
rights will be unjustly deprived. Thus, the legislature should adopt
the clear and convincing evidence standard to assure that appropriate
judicial deference is accorded to a fit parent's estimation of what is
best for her children.1
8 5
Most importantly, the proposed amendments to section 3104
will enable the state to promote children's health and welfare more
effectively. First, the amendments give effect to Troxel's recognition
that fit parents, not judges, are in the best position to determine what
contact will serve a child's best interests. 186 Further, the heightened
burden of proof will help insulate parents against protracted litigation
that can, in and of itself, undermine a parent's capacity to care for
her children. 187 Finally, while they enhance parental rights, the
amendments simultaneously remain sensitive to situations where
denying grandparent visitation may harm the child. An example of
one such situation is where the grandparent has played an integral
role in raising the child. 188  In such circumstances, where the
grandparent has acted as the child's de facto parent, the grandparent
should have little trouble producing clear and affirmative evidence




In Harris, the California Supreme Court veered from precedent
and dealt a crippling blow to custodial parents' fundamental child-
rearing rights. Harris decimates sole custodial parents' rights by
subjecting their visitation preferences to veto by noncustodial parents
184. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
185. See Varela, supra note 73, at 617.
186. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
187. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 169 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting);
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
188. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98-100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. See Harris, 96 P.3d at 170 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
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who, by definition, have no legal authority to make parenting
decisions. Further, the court's conclusion that a custodial parent's
constitutional rights are never implicated when the noncustodial
parent endorses visitation leaves custodial parents defenseless
against a host of state abuses. Finally, the court's refusal to require
clear and convincing evidence that denying visitation will harm the
child subjects families to unwarranted and burdensome government
intrusion.
The California legislature can, and should, reverse the damage
done by the Harris decision. By amending section 3104 to (1)
expressly grant sole custodial parents the exclusive right to permit or
deny visitation, and (2) heighten the showing required to rebut the
presumption in favor of parents' visitation preferences, the
legislature can reestablish the primacy of custodial parents' rights to
raise their children. Even more important, the proposed
amendments, if adopted, will enhance the state's ability to protect the
children that section 3104 was presumably designed to protect.
Few liberties are more fundamental than that of a custodial
parent to raise her child as she sees best. This liberty interest
includes the right to avoid relationships that the parent believes may
harm her child. Because custodial parents are in the best position to
assess what contact will harm or benefit their children, the courts
must strive to respect these parents' visitation preferences in all but
the most unusual of situations. Harris fails to defer to these
principles. Therefore, the California legislature should act to
mitigate the decision's damaging effects, and grant parental
autonomy the protection it deserves.
Jeff H. Pham*
* J.D. Candidate, December 2005. I am deeply grateful to the editors and staff
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, who toiled tirelessly to bring this
article to print. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, who sacrificed to
enable my successes; to my brothers, for their good humor and steadfast
support; and to Camly, for her love.
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